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TEAR-ME-OPEN SOFTWARE LICENSE
AGREEMENTS: A UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE PERSPECTIVE ON
AN INNOVATIVE CONTRACT
OF ADHESION*
I.
A.

THE

INTRODUCTION

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEAR-ME-OPEN AGREEMENT

The introduction of powerful low-cost microcomputers has resulted
in the development and mass marketing of inexpensive, ready to use
software by the software industry for use in personal computers.' The
2
market for such software is large, lucrative, and rapidly expanding.
In order to protect intellectual property rights in the software they
produce, 3 and to limit their liability for defective software, software developers are attempting to establish contracts which will govern the
software transactions between themselves and their customers in the
National Third Place, Third Annual Computer Law Writing Competition.
1. A whole new software industry has developed around the personal computer.
Instead of programs being customized for individual users, the marketed programs tend to be standardized and designed to meet common purchaser needs.
The computer programs that are currently marketed are varied and include programs for video games, programs for automatic flight systems, and programs for
business planning. The basic idea is to allow a computer owner who has neither
the time, the skill nor the inclination to write or pay for his or her own customized programs to obtain sophisticated, easy to operate programming at a relatively low price.
Note, Software Piracy and the Personal Computer: Is the 1980 Copyright Act Effective?, 4
COMPUTER L.J. 171, 173 (1983).
2. See THE COMPUTERWORLD SOFTWARE BUYERs' GUIDE, Vol. 7 (Dec. 1983) (This
publication contains about 10,000 products from 3200 vendors and by no means includes
every software product or vendor in the United States.); McComas, The Hard Sell Comes
to Software, 110 FORTUNE 59 (Sept. 17, 1984). (The market for microcomputer software in
the business environment, mainly spreadsheet analysis, word processing, and data base
management will reach $1.8 billion in sales in 1984 and is expected to double by 1988.);
Toong & Gupta, A New Directionin PersonalComputer Software, 72 PROC. IEEE 377, 378
(Mar. 1984) (Whereas customized software for small systems is typically priced between
$500 and $5000, home oriented software is usually priced under $50. Between these two
extremes are the general business packages such as VisiCalc, VisiPlot, and Lotus 1-2-3.).
3. See generally Brooks, Shrink-Wrapped License Agreements: Do They Prevent the
Existence of a "FirstSale"?, 1 COMPUTER LAw. 17 (1984).
*
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mass market. Logistical problems exist in obtaining signed agreements
from purchasers in the mass market. 4 Therefore, software developers
are using so-called "tear-me-open" agreements to accomplish their
goals.
A tear-me-open agreement consists of a printed agreement placed
on the outside of a computer diskette or cassette package which is then
shrink-wrapped under transparent cellophane.5 The written terms of
the agreement are legible through the cellophane, enabling the potential customer to read the contract without opening the wrapper. The
writing contains a notice indicating that if the shrink-wrap is removed,
6
the purchaser is bound by the terms of the putative agreement.
The typical tear-me-open agreement contains the following
7
provisions:
1) A "license agreement" which permits the purchaser/licensee/
tearer s to use the software on one computer only. The customer is permitted to copy the software for archival or backup
purposes and may merge it or parts of it into other programs.
A copyright notice must appear on all such copies. The customer may transfer the software to another user provided the
other user agrees to the terms of the original agreement. 9 If
the first customer transfers the program, he or she must destroy all copies of the program remaining in his or her possession. The license is terminated by non-compliance with any of
the terms of the agreement. The duration of the license is indefinite, but on termination the licensee must destroy all copies
of the software in his or her possession.
2) A limited warranty, in which the developer warrants that the
4. Software for microcomputers is usually distributed via a network of publishers,

distributors, dealers, and retailers, and often by mail-order. J.T. SOMA, COMPUTER TECH.
AND THE LAw 89-90 (1983).
5. Brooks, supra note 3, at 19.
6. IBM's tear-me-open agreement contains the following notice: "YOU SHOULD
CAREFULLY READ THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS BEFORE
OPENING THIS DISKETTE PACKAGE. OPENING THIS DISKETTE PACKAGE INDICATES YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THESE TERMS AND CONDITIONS. IF YOU
DO NOT AGREE WITH THEM, YOU SHOULD PROMPTLY RETURN THE PACKAGE UNOPENED; AND YOUR MONEY WILL BE REFUNDED."
7. This is based on IBM's tear-me-open software license agreement found accompanying such packages as DisplayWrite 2 and Disk Operating System.
8. As this Note will demonstrate, it is not clear whether the tear-me-open agreement results in an outright sale, lease, or license of the software. This Note will refer to
the tearer of the shrink-wrap as the "customer" or "purchaser" in order to prevent any
confusion in this regard.
9. Some agreements prohibit any transfer of the software to third parties. See

Cooper, Forming and Enforcing "Tear Me Open" Licenses, PRACTISING L. INST. COMPUTER LAW 4 (Nov. 1983).
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cassette or diskette is free from defects in materials or workmanship. The duration of this warranty is limited. 10 The
software contained on the disk is expressly provided "as is"
with no warranties. Implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose are expressly disclaimed.
3) Remedies available to the customer are limited to replacement
of disks not meeting the warranty standards or a refund of the
purchase price of the software.
4) A choice of law clause stating that the agreement will be governed by the laws of a particular state."
5) A merger clause stating that the writing is the complete and
exclusive agreement between supplier and customer.
6) A warranty registration card which must be returned to the
supplier. Some software suppliers attempt to obtain acknowledgement of the terms of the agreement by means of this warranty registration card which must be returned to the supplier
12
for any warranty terms to be effective.
After demonstrating that the software purchase transaction is best
analyzed from a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) perspective,' 3 this
Note will examine the enforceability of the warranty disclaimer terms,
limitation of remedies, choice of law terms, and merger clause from a
UCC perspective. While state and federal consumer protection laws are
obviously relevant to tear-me-open agreements, a survey and analysis of
the impact of such laws is beyond the scope of this Note. 14 Copyright
aspects will not be covered except where they are helpful to the analysis of the above topics.' 5
B.

THE COST OF RETURNED GOODS: SOFTWARE VERSUS OTHER GOODS

The concept of warranty disclaimers offered in connection with
consumer goods on a take-it-or-leave-it basis is not a new one. Manufacturers frequently attempt to limit their liability through the use of legal
limitations. These limitations include limited warranties; warranty disclaimers and limitations of remedies printed on packages, labels, and
17
containers;' 6 warranty cards to be mailed in by the consumer; and
10. The period of IBM's warranty is 90 days.
11. IBM's agreement specifies that Florida law governs.
12. Brooks, supra note 3, at 19.
13. See infra notes 36-81 and accompanying text.
14. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act - Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982). This Act sets minimum standards for the content and for consumer remedies.
15. For a discussion of the copyright aspects of tear-me-open agreements, see generally Brooks, supra note 3.
16. See, e.g., Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1982); Monsanto
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warranty disclaimers printed in owners manuals and instruction booklets.18 In these cases the purchaser can reject the offered terms by returning the goods for a refund of the purchase price. Despite the
apparent similarities between these agreements and tear-me-open
agreements, the nature of computer software is such that tear-me-open
agreements pose some unique analytical problems.
The manufacturer of non-software goods suffers a minimal loss if a
purchaser returns the product after inspecting it and its limited warranty. The manufacturer recovers the product and the consumer recovers the purchase price, provided the consumer has not damaged the
goods. This is not true in the case of computer software in the mass
market.
Unless prevented from doing so, the consumer can easily copy the
contents of the disk before returning it to the manufacturer for a refund. By doing so, the consumer receives the products of the software
producer's labors and intellectual efforts without paying for them. The
warranties offered by the software producer are extremely limited and
offer the consumer little protection. Therefore, the consumer who
purchases the software and obtains its limited warranties and remedies
is in a similar position to a person who steals the software and receives
no warranties or remedies. 19 Because consumers seem to be indifferent
about purchasing the software and receiving limited warranties or copying the software and receiving no warranties, software producers have
attempted to use the protective cellophane wrapper and the tear-meopen agreement to protect themselves. The cellophane wrapper protects the producer because once the cellophane is removed, the purchaser is deemed to have accepted the agreement which prohibits
copying.
Tear-me-open software agreements thus pose an unusual problem
for courts faced with the question of whether or not to enforce them.
Conventional analysis of standard form agreements may not provide
satisfactory answers. This Note will use the UCC and classical contract
analysis to predict and suggest ways in which courts might handle the
issue of enforcement of the warranty and remedy terms of tear-meopen agreements.
Agric. Prod. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Pennington Grain
& Seed v. Tuten, 422 So. 2d 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Pfizer Genetics v. Williams
Management, 204 Neb. 151, 281 N.W.2d 536 (1979); Willoughby v. Ciba Geigy Corp., 601
S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
17. See, e.g., Van Den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 576 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978).
18. See, e.g., Taterka v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 140, 271 N.W.2d 653 (1978); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975); Dougall v. Brown Bay Boat
Works & Sales, 287 Minn. 290, 178 N.W.2d 217 (1970).
19. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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II.

APPLICABILITY OF THE UCC TO TEAR-ME-OPEN
SOFTWARE AGREEMENTS
A.

SOFTWARE AS GOODS

In analyzing the effect of particular terms in the tear-me-open
agreements, the first step is to determine whether or not the UCC gov20
erns the transaction.
Off-the-shelf computer software transactions in the mass market
differ from many other computer software transactions. They are not
incident to any sale or lease of hardware, 2 ' nor are they a part of data
processing services, 22 and they do not involve custom designed
software. 23 Software transactions involving tear-me-open agreements
simply involve computer programs fixed in a material medium such as a
24
diskette or cassette.
'25
Article 2 of the UCC applies broadly to "transactions in goods."
Thus, in order to fall under the UCC, software must be categorized as
"goods."'26 Initially, computer software, however, appears to defy legal
20. U.C.C. § 2-314(a) implies a warranty of merchantability, while U.C.C. § 2-315 implies a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. U.C.C. §§ 2-302 and 2-316 impose limitations on warranty disclaimers. If the tear-me-open transaction is not governed by the
U.C.C., customers acquiring defective software through such agreements would most
probably have to rely on negligence theories in order to recover damages caused by the
defects.
21. See, e.g., Jaskey Fin. & Leasing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (contract for the sale of computer equipment, programming, and installation services within the scope of the U.C.C.); Chatlos Sys. Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 479 F.
Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980) (purchase of hardware and
software was found to be subject to the implied warranties found in the U.C.C. Article 2);
Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979) (the fact that software is intangible does not
mean it is not "goods" as defined by U.C.C. § 2-106); Suntogs of Miami, Inc. v. Burroughs
Corp., 433 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (purchase of a computer system consisting
of hardware and software was covered by the U.C.C.); Kalil Bottling v. Burroughs Corp.,
127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (contract for the sale of computer hardware and software fell under the U.C.C.).
22. See Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C.
1970), qff'd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1970), (contract for the performance of data processing
services was not governed by the U.C.C.).
23. See supra note 21 (most of the cases in note 21 involve custom designed software).
24. Off-the-shelf software is sold in package form with no service backup. The user
merely loads it into a computer and runs it. See Goldberg, Software Protection and Marketing, 2 PRACTISING LAW INST. COMPUTER LAW at 62-63 (1983).

25. U.C.C. § 2-102.
26. Id. This is not always the case. Article 2 of the U.C.C. may be applied to service
contracts where "application is suitable by analogy." See Vitromar Piece Dye Works v.
Lawrence of London, Ltd., 119 Ill. App. 2d 301, 256 N.E.2d 135 (1969).
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A computer program is, in essence, information di-

recting a computer to execute certain operations. 28 The value of a computer program thus lies in the intangible information it conveys.2 9 A
computer program, however, must be encoded on some material me30
dium in order for it to exist outside of the mind of the programmer.
Computer software encoded in a magnetic disk, tape, punch cards, or
read only memory possesses the features necessary to make it a "good"
under UCC Article 2, sections 2-102 and 2-105. Section 2-105 defines
"goods" as: "all things (including specially manufactured goods) which
are moveable at the time of identification to the contract for sale ...."
The tangible embodiment of a computer program on a disk, tape,
printout, or other storage medium is certainly a "thing" and is clearly
moveable, whether in the form of storage medium or electronic data
transmission. 31 For this reason, ready made computer software should
32
be regarded as "goods" for the purposes of a UCC analysis.
Using the above analysis, it is hard to see how mass-marketed
software could be regarded as a service rather than a good.33 Any confusion over whether such software is a good or a service may arise because computer software production is labor intensive. 34 Furthermore,
in the past, most computer-software-related-litigation involved customwritten software, 35 computer service bureaus, or data processing companies.3 6 The intangibility of intellectual property may also present con37
ceptual problems in this area.
27. Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.CC, 77 MiCH. L. REV. 1149
(1979).
28. Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 406, 408 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
("[S]oftware denotes the information loaded into the machine and the directions given to
the machine... as to what it is to do and upon what command.").
29. The trial court in Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765,
769 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979), acknowledged
that the purchaser of computer software is buying the product of ideas or concepts. Thus,
the value of software, for which consumers will pay, must lie in those ideas or concepts.
30. Program disks indisputably involve ideas and their expression, but they are, and
must be, in tangible form. Brooks, supra note 3, at 20.
31. Note, supra note 27, at 1152.
32. See id at 1150; Brooks, supra note 3, at 20.
33. "Service" usually involves labor supplied for a price. "[A] 'service' is not property-tangible or otherwise. Rather it is an act .. " Indiana Dept. of State Revenue v.
Cable Brazil, Inc., 177 Ind.App. 450, 400, 380 N.E.2d 555, 561 (1978) (deciding whether supply of electricity is goods or services; software may be in the form of electrical impulses
travelling along a wire for the purposes of data transmission).
34. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 27-28.
35. See, e.g., Burroughs Corp. v. Hill Affiliates, Inc., 423 So. 2d 1348 (Ala. 1982).
36. See, e.g., Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C.
1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971).
37. This confusion is well resolved by the trial court's statement in Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd on other
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B.

SALE OR LICENSE AGREEMENT?

Even though ready-made computer software is easily categorized as
goods under the UCC, this alone does not mean that the tear-me-open
transaction is governed by Article 2 of the UCC 38 Article 2 of the UCC
is entitled "Sales." The Code defines a "sale" as "the passing of title
from the seller to the buyer for a price."'3 9 It can be surmised from the
provisions of the typical tear-me-open software agreement that the
40
drafters do not intend to convey title of the software to the purchaser.
Therefore, the agreement is styled as a "license agreement," rather
than as a "sale." In fact the word "sale" is never mentioned in IBM's
license agreement. 41 The fact that full title may not have passed to a
customer acquiring software which contains a tear-me-open agreement
should not, however, preclude application of the UCC to the
transaction.
The tear-me-open agreement purports to grant the purchaser a license to use the accompanying software. It is not, however, clear exactly what "license agreement" means in the context of tear-me-open
agreements. 42 License agreements are commonly used in the computer
43
trade when large systems and custom-written software are involved.
44
Courts have generally treated these as lease agreements, which are
fully paid up at the beginning of the term. 45 But in the case of mass
marketed software, the term is indefinite.
Although Article 2 of the UCC is entitled "Sales," courts have applied it to non-sale transactions such as leases and bailments. 46 The rationale for this is based on the use of the word "transactions" in Article
grounds, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979). "Although the ideas or concepts involved in the custom designed software remained Honeywell's intellectual property, Triangle was purchasing the product of those concepts. That product required effort to produce, but it was a
product nevertheless and, though intangible, is more readily characterized as 'goods' than
'services.'" But see 4 THE ScoTT REPORT 1, 4 (July 1984) (identification of intellectual
property with "services").
38. Article 2 of the U.C.C. may be limited to sales only. The transaction under consideration is styled as a "license agreement" as opposed to a "sale."
39. U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
40. Cooper, supra note 9, at 5.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 60.
44. Holmes, Application of Article Two of The Uniform Commercial Code to Computer System Acquisitions, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER TECH. L.J. 1, 25 (1982).
45. See, e.g., Vitromar Piece Dye Works v. Lawrence of London Ltd., 119 Ill. App. 2d
301, 256 N.E.2d 135 (1969).
46. W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-102:1; see also Annotation, Application of Warranty Provisions of Uniform Commercial Code to Bailments, 48
A.L.R. 3d 668 (1973).
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2, section 2-102. 47 This term is not defined within Article 2 and arguments have been made that the word "transactions" encompasses contracts other than sales. 48 Some courts have applied Article 2 to
transactions in goods not involving a sale by analogizing the transaction
to a sale. 49 Courts will also treat the transaction as a sale if the policies
underlying the UCC section to be applied are reasonably applicable to
the non-sale situation.50 An important factor in this policy argument is
the degree of similarity between the non-sale transaction and an actual
51
sale.
The license agreement under consideration in this Note is similar
to a sale. Although the licensor does not intend the licensee to get full
title to the software, 52 the licensor gives the licensee a right to use and
dispose of the software subject to certain conditions. 3 The licensee
views the transaction as a conditional sale. The conditions involved are
similar to those which publishers of books and musical recordings impose in order to preserve their copyright.5 4 The conditions used by publishers are substantially the same as the provisions of the Copyright Act
pertaining to the sale of media containing copyrighted material. 55 In
fact some tear-me-open agreements explicitly state that the "purchaser"
owns the disk, not the program on the disk. 56

C.

TEAR-ME-OPEN AGREEMENTS AS SALES

As indicated above, courts have given conflicting opinions as to the
47. Annotation, What Constitutes a Transaction,a Contractfor Sale or a Sale Within
the Scope of UC.C.Article 2, 4 A.L.R. 85, 91 (1981).
48. Nycum, Liabilityfor Malfunction of a Computer Program,7 RUTGERS COMPUTER
TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (1979).
49. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 46, § 2-102:1. See generally Annotation, supra note 46,
at 668.
50. Id See generally Annotation, supra note 46.
51. See, e.g., W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
(the court relied on the economic equivalency between a sale and the transaction in question to place the transaction within the UCC).
52. The licensor views the transaction as a license, and title does not pass in a license
agreement.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
54. Most paperbacks contain a notice similar to the following- "All rights reserved.
No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form, by any means, electronic
or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system without permission in writing from the publisher." Musical recordings
contain a notice similar to the following- "All Rights Reserved. Unauthorized duplication
is a violation of applicable laws."
55. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1978). See also Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528 (1853)
(buyer of a map does not acquire the right to print the map).
56. Brooks, supra note 3, at 17.
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applicability of Article 2 to non-sale transactions.5 7 In the case of tearme-open agreements, the issue may be resolved by a finding that the
agreement is completely unenforceable due to the manner in which the
contract was supposedly formed.5s If the agreement is found to be unenforceable, courts would have to supply the contract terms based on
the conduct and intent of the parties. 59 The consumer's intent would
most likely be the outright purchase of the software. The software producer's intent would probably not be an outright sale, at least to the extent that it would deprive the software producer of the right to prevent
copying of the software. 60 The producer's fear of losing the copyright is
unfounded because the fact that there has been a sale for UCC purposes
(i.e., for the use of UCC warranty theories) does not necessarily mean
61
that the purchasers are owners of the copyright.
D.

TEAR-ME-OPEN AGREEMENTS AS ANALOGIES TO SALES

Analogizing transactions involving tear-me-open license agreements
to sales is an additional method to have Article 2 of the UCC govern. If
the license is found to be a lease or bailment, policy may require that it
62
be governed by the UCC
Courts, however, should interpret these license agreements as sales
and not leases or bailments due to several factors. These factors include the rule that ambiguous contracts should be construed against the
drafter, the fact that the transaction is economically equivalent to a
sale, and the fact that courts traditionally disfavor terms limiting the
use and disposition of property by "purchasers." A corollary to this
would be to regard the license agreement as a conditional sale. The
conditions would be acceptance of terms disallowing copying the
software.

63

As a result of the numerous ways in which a transaction in ready
made software can be placed within the scope of the UCC, this Note
57.
58.
59.
60.

Annotation, supra note 47, at 91.
See infra notes 64-92 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
1&

61. Brooks, supra note 3, at 21; ("license is an intellectual property notion, not a tangible property notion").
62. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transp. Credit Clearinghouse, 59 Misc. 2d 226,

298 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585
(App. Div. 1970) (In finding that a lease fell under the U.C.C., the court stated: "[I]t
would be anomalous if this large body of law were subject to different rules of law than
other transactions which tend to achieve identical economic results."). See also Baker v.
City of Seattle, 70 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971). But see Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69,
285 A.2d 607 (1970) (warranty provisions of the UCC were not applied to a lease).

63. R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-204, 47 (3d ed. 1982). See also
U.C.C. § 2-615.
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concludes that the transaction is best analyzed under the provisions of
the UCC.
III.

FORMATION OF THE AGREEMENT

As a result of the unusual nature of the acceptance specified in the
tear-me-open agreement, courts might find that no binding contract results from the agreement. Such a finding would obviously render the
4
warranty disclaimers and limitations of remedy inoperative.6
There are two probable methods in which customers would obtain
software accompanied by tear-me-open agreements. The most common
occurs when the customer obtains the software from a computer store.65
The other method is by mail order.66 In both situations, an issue arises
as to the validity of the specified mode of acceptance of the license
agreement.
It is easy to imagine the circumstances surrounding the acquisition
of the typical tear-me-open agreement. In the over-the-counter situation the following is likely to occur. The customer chooses the software
he or she wants without reading the license agreement. He or she pays
for and takes the software home or to his or her office to run on his or
her computer. In his or her eagerness to use the newly acquired package he or she tears open the shrink wrap, not expecting to be bound by
any contract in doing so. At some stage the license agreement tumbles
out and the unfortunate licensee discovers its terms. If the customer
actually notices the agreement before tearing open the wrapper, he or
she probably ignores it or at best makes a mental note to read it later.
A similar process most likely occurs in the case of acquisition by mail
order.
It is of course possible that the actual agreement took place in the
store where the customer first took possession of the software in return
becomes
for money.6 7 Assuming that this is not the case, the issue
68
whether or not the tear-me-open offer is actually accepted.
To form an agreement, a "manifestation of mutual assent on the
part of two... persons" is required. 69 Assent need not be in words, but
may be manifested by conduct. 70 The party engaging in such conduct,
64. The following analysis of the validity of the process of offer and acceptance will
also be helpful in determining whether the disclaimers of warranty and limitation of remedies are part of the bargain between the software customer and the software producer.
65. Cooper, supra note 9, at 1.

66. Id
67. See infra notes 89 and 92 and accompanying text.
68. In this Note, offer and acceptance will be discussed without special reference to
the UCC as the UCC does not deal in any great detail with the formation of contracts.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 3 (1979).
70. 1d § 19(1).
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however, must know or have reason to know that the other party may
infer assent from his or her conduct.7 1 Whether a party has reason to
know this is a question of fact, to be determined by the circumstances of
the case and by the person involved. 72 The critical issue in contract formation is not assent, but what the other party is justified in regarding
as assent. 73 It has been suggested that a reasonable person standard be
74
used in determining whether or not there is acceptance.
Whether it is reasonable to believe that tearing open a wrapper is
manifestation of the acceptance of an offer is debatable. Perhaps a reasonable software purchaser should be held to know that the act of tearing open a cellophane wrapper constitutes acceptance of an offer.
Courts, however, could determine that the software customer, acting in
his or her own interests, should examine and read the outside of a
software packet. The customer would therefore be charged with knowledge of the offer and that tearing open the wrapper is its specified mode
of acceptance. 75 The conspicuousness or legibility of the writing is
clearly an important factor in the objective determination of the of76
feree's knowledge.
Corbin prophetically raised a closely analogous issue in the analysis
of the situation in which an offeror attempts to infer acceptance from
some ordinary act of the offeree that the offeree does not wish to be an
acceptance. 77 If tearing open a shrink-wrapped package containing a
newly acquired software program is an ordinary act which the customer
does not intend to be an acceptance, then the offer is not accepted by
that act. The unusual specified mode of acceptance and the lack of conspicuousness of the notice are strong arguments against the formation
of a contract. This argument does not, however, dispose of the issue.
Acceptance of the offer may be found by other means.
It is possible that the offeror's specification of tearing open the
wrapper as a manifestation of acceptance is not crucial to the accept71. 1& § 19(2).
72. MI.§ 19(2) comment b.
73. S. WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 35 (1957).

74. Id at § 94.
75. The following principle would then apply: "It will not do for a man to enter into
a contract, and, when called on to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not read it
when he signed it, or did not know what it contained." Upton v. Tribilock, 91 U.S. 45, 50
(1875).
76. S. WILLISTON, supra note 73, § 90C.
77. 1 A.L. CORBIN, CoNTRACTs § 73 (1951)
(If A offers his land to B for a price, saying that B may signify his acceptance by
eating his breakfast or hanging out his flag on Washington's birthday or by attending church on Sunday, he does not thereby make such an action by B operative as an acceptance against B's will
..... ).
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ance of the offer. It may not be crucial as a result of two points. First,
the offeree may be deemed to have accepted the offer by his or her silence 78 or exercise of dominion over the goods.79 Second, the acceptance may be deemed to have occurred at the computer store with the
modification of the contract
tear-me-open agreement being a post-sale
80
which may or may not be binding.
Based on the above analysis, the tear-me-open mode of acceptance
may be found to be invalid.8 ' This may mean that the customer is free
to open the software package without incurring any obligation. On the
other hand, acceptance of the license agreement may be found in the
82
offeree's silence or failure to return the goods.
Silence is an unusual form of acceptance 83 and might pose problems
in this situation. Ordinarily, silence as a mode of acceptance should be
stated in the offer, or the offeree should have reason to understand that
silence or inaction is a manifestation of assent.84 Once again, this hinges
on whether the terms of the printed agreement and their conspicuousness would give the offeree reason to believe he or she had accepted the
offer.8 5 Allowing the offeree to open the shrink-wrap clearly defeats
the drafters' objective of prohibiting copying. Furthermore, if the offeree is free to return the software for a full refund after opening it,
there is little to stop the offeree from copying it.
Alternatively, the exercise of dominion over the software may be a
more effective mode of acceptance. Any act inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property binds the offeree to the offered
terms unless they are manifestly unreasonable.8 6 Thus if the software
customer keeps the software and uses it,8 7 the customer will be bound
by the terms accompanying it,88 as long as the terms are not
unreasonable.
If the software customer is objectively ignorant of the existence of
78.
79.
80.
81.

See
See
See
See

infra notes 82-85 and accompanying
infra notes 89-92 and accompanying
infra notes 86-88 and accompanying
supra notes 68-77 and accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.

82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTs, supra note 69, § 89 (1979).

83. Id, § 89 comment a.
84. Id. § 69(b).
85. See ikfra note 105 and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRAcTs, supra note 69, § 69 comment c (If there is some element of reliance by the
offeror on the offeree's silence, or the offeree objectively manifests some intent to accept,
albeit uncommunicated, acceptance is more likely to be found.).
86.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 69, § 69(2).

§ 2-606(1)(c).
87. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 46, at 2-606:6.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.

Compare U.C.C.
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the license agreement lurking under the shrink-wrap 89 and the act of
opening the wrapper is not a valid form of acceptance, 90 the software
transaction must have occurred in the computer store when the goods
were purchased. Thus, the contract containing the license agreement
would only reach the customer after the transaction has taken place
and would not form part of the original agreement.9 1 Circumstances,
however, may lead to the conclusion that the post-sale writing is a modification of the original agreement and may be binding if accepted. 92
IV.

WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS

The tear-me-open license agreement purports to disclaim all warranties on the software, express or implied.93 The existence of warranties on software is of great importance, because a majority of the public
is under the incorrect impression that computers never make mistakes.
This impression is not justified by the realities of the computer world.
While hardware may be extremely dependable, software is often unreliable.94 Software is often put into the marketplace hurriedly and without adequate testing. 95 Software, moreover, is inherently unreliable 96
and the consequences of this unreliability may be serious. Personal injuries and property damages may even result from software errors. 97 A
considerable amount of litigation has arisen as a result of defects in
computer software. 98
Under the UCC, the implied warranties of merchantability 99 and
fitness for a particular purpose'0° may be disclaimed by proper and conspicuous contract terms. 10 1 Most tear-me-open license agreements satisfy the first requirement by using almost the exact language specified
in the UCC.10 2 But it is by no means clear that they satisfy the UCC's
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs, supra note

69, § 19

comment b.

90. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
91. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 63, § 2-204:29. See also Willoughby v. Ciba Geigy
Corp., 601 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
92. See Karczenewski v. Ford Motor Co., 382 F. Supp. 1346, qff'd mem., 515 F.2d 511
(7th Cir. 1975).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
94. Immel, Evaluating Software, 3 POPULAR COMPUTING 43 (Sept. 1984) (There is too
much software on the market that does not work properly due to defects.).
95. Id,
96. Id. at 45.
97. Nycum, supra note 48, at 1.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 21 and 22.
99. U.C.C. § 2-314.
100. Id. § 2-315.
101. Id. § 2-316(2).
102. IBM's warranty disclaimer reads as follows:
LIMITED WARRANTY
THE PROGRAM IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
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conspicuousness requirement.

Actual knowledge of a disclaimer is not required for it to be effective against the buyer, provided the disclaimer is conspicuous. 10 3 There
is, however, a line of authority which holds that a purchaser must agree
to the disclaimer for it to be binding. 1° 4
Under the UCC, a term is conspicuous, "when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed
it."'10 5 Whether a term is conspicuous is a question of law.'1 s A strong
case can be made that the disclaimer clause in the IBM tear-me-open
agreement mentioned above is not conspicuous enough to be effective.
Although the typeface of the disclaimer is larger than that of the surrounding text, the surrounding text is very small and may itself be inconspicuous. 10 7 The entire agreement is not easily noticeable. It is
shrink-wrapped onto the back of the box in such a manner that a reasonable person might not notice it.'0 8
The disclaimers contained in the tear-me-open agreement could be
regarded as a post-sale writing which will not affect any warranties
made at the time of sale.' 0 9 This argument follows from the fact that
the customer only notices the agreement after purchasing the software.
Therefore, the agreement was not part of the basis of the bargain and
cannot be binding on the purchaser. 1 10
KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE
QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM
PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU (AND NOT IBM OR AN AUTHORIZED PERSONAL COMPUTER DEALER) ASSUME THE ENTIRE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
103. R. ANDERSON, supra note 63, § 2-316:33. See Architectural Aluminum Corp. v.
Macar, 70 Misc. 2d 495, 333 N.Y.S.2d 818, 822 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
104. Higel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983, 989-90 (1975). See also
R. ANDERSON, supra note 63, § 2-316:25.
105. U.C.C. § 1-201(10). See also Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co., 352 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d
228, 231 (1967) (disclaimer printed in capital letters on the back of the contract was not
conspicuous). But see Architectural Aluminum, 70 Misc. 2d at 495, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 818
(disclaimer in bold-faced type surrounded by one inch black margin was conspicuous).
106. U.C.C. § 1-201(10).
107. A & M Produce v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982).
108. See, e.g., Willoughby v. Ciba Geigy Corp., 601 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
(disclaimer of warranty printed on the side of a container, not brought to the attention of
the purchaser was ineffective); Pfizer Genetics, Inc. v. Williams Mgmnt. Co., 204 Neb. 151,
281 N.W.2d 536, 539 (1979).
109. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 63, § 2-316:32. See also J. WHIrE & R. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-4 (2d ed. 1980).

110. See Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691, 697 (S.Dak. 1976) (Where the
buyer is given no opportunity to see and read the label, the court will not elevate the disclaimer to the status of a bargain.).
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Under the UCC, if the seller makes an express warranty, it may
not be disclaimed."' In tear-me-open agreements, it is not easy to find
an express warranty on the face of the writing."12 The agreement includes an integration clause which excludes any express warranty
which may be made by the supplier." 3
The software itself is fixed on an anonymous mass-produced disk
which is concealed in a sealed container. It therefore follows that some
description of the goods is needed so that the agreement will not be void
for lack of definiteness as to subject matter. Such a description may be
found in the software package labels or in the advertising of the
software's capabilities." 4 It appears, however, that most software producers are careful to make very limited claims as to the capabilities of
their products. Thus, even if an express warranty is found from advertising materials, it will probably not offer a great deal of protection as to
the quality of the software." 5 The descriptive language will merely
give rise to a warranty that the programs are of a certain type," 6 such
as word processing, spreadsheet, or operating system. If the implied
warranties of fitness for a particular use11 7 and merchantability'" are
disclaimed, defective programs, unless almost entirely useless, would
satisfy the producer's obligations under the express warranty." 9 This
would follow because the seller merely warrants that the software is
something fitting the generic description on the box. There are cases
which have upheld integration clauses as excluding all warranties and
statements in advertising material which would constitute express warranties.12 ° These cases, however, usually involve agreements reached
111. U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.
112. In the case of IBM, the same standard contract is used for a variety of software
products such as DisplayWrite 2 and Disk Operating System. The contract contains no
mention of the type of software it purports to license.
113. IBM's integration clause reads as follows: 'YOU ... AGREE THAT IT IS THE
COMPLETE AND EXCLUSIVE STATEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN US
WHICH SUPERCEDES ANY PROPOSAL OR PRIOR AGREEMENT, ORAL OR
WRITTEN, AND ANY OTHER COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN US RELATING TO
THE SUBJECT MATER OF THE AGREEMENT."
114. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 46, § 2-313:03 (The tendency under the Code seems to
be to hold that most advertising rises to the level of express warranty.). See also Interco,
Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. App. 1976). But see Hill v. BASF Wyandotte, 696 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1982) (oral representations by salesperson were not binding as
warranties).
115. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 46, § 2-313:6.
116. Id. at § 2-313:6.
117. U.C.C. § 2-314.
118. Id. § 2-315.
119. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 46, § 2-313:06.
120. See Jaskey Finance and Leasing Co. v. Display Data Corp., 564 F. Supp. 160 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (disclaimer of express and implied warranties on computer products held effec-
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through some bargaining process. Therefore, where the disclaimer and
integration clause are offered in circumstances involving no opportunity
for bargaining, the opposite result may be reached.12 1
Courts could, however, view language such as "supplier warrants
that the disk on which the program is embodied is free from defects in
materials and workmanship,"' 22 as creating an express warranty. This
express warranty would cover the actual software because the customer
clearly does not intend to obtain a mere disk through the tear-me-open
agreement. The goods which the customer intends to acquire consist of
a disk containing a certain program. Although they look the same, a
blank disk is different from one which contains a useful program. Thus
the "disk" referred to in the limited warranty is the disk bargained for,
meaning the one containing software. Defects in workmanship which
occur during the production of the disk could also include defects in the
programming which led to the altered magnetic properties distinguishing it from an unprogrammed disk.
Another basis for voiding the disclaimer of the implied warranties
is the doctrine of unconscionability.' 23 While the term "unconscionability" is not defined in the UCC and has many interpretations, certain
guidelines for its application have emerged from the case law.' 24 The
principle behind the doctrine of unconscionability is the prevention of
"oppression and unfair surprise.' 25 Unconscionability is a question of
law.' 26 The basic test for unconscionability is "whether, in the light of
the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the
particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the
1 27
making of the contract."'
tive where the agreement was integrated and the parol evidence rule barred inclusion of
advertising material containing alleged express warranties). See also Pennsylvania Gas

Co. v. Secord Brothers, Inc., 73 Misc. 2d 1031, 343 N.Y.S.2d 256, affl'd, 357 N.Y.S.2d 702
(N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
121. See, e.g., Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, 723 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1982); Jaskey
Finance and Leasing Co. v. Display Data Corp., 564 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
122. IBM's tear-me-open agreement contains the following "limited warranty": "IBM
warrants the diskettes or cassettes on which the program is furnished to be free from defects in materials and workmanship for a period of ninety (90) days from the date of delivery to you ....

"

123. U.C.C. § 2-302 (a court may refuse to enforce any contractual clause which it finds
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made).
124. A & M Produce v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982) (This case gives a good outline of the elements of unconscionability as applied

to the sale of technology in a business environment.). See also U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1.
125. A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 484, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
126. Id.
127. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1. See also Leff, Unconscionability and The Code--The
Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 488 (1967).
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Unconscionability involves procedural and substantive elements. 128
Procedural unconscionability is "bargaining naughtiness,"'129 while sub130
stantive unconscionability relates to "evils in the resulting contract."
Most courts require the presence of both procedural and substantive un13
conscionability in order to void a contractual clause. '
Under the UCC, procedural unconscionability is not usually found
with respect to warranty disclaimers.13 2 Nevertheless, procedural unconscionability is possible in the case of tear-me-open agreements, because the contract is one of adhesion, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. 133 The consumer has no opportunity to bargain for more
favorable terms. If the tear-me-open mode of acceptance is valid, the
consumer may unwittingly be bound to terms which the customer normally would not accept. 134 Agreements using the tear-me-open mode of
acceptance may thus be regarded as leading to unfair surprise 13 5 and
lacking meaningful choice 13 6 for the customer.
The relative sophistication of the parties is also a factor in determining the existence of procedural unconscionability. 13 7 Because computer technology is new to most consumers and businesspeople, they
128. Leff, supra note 127, at 487. See also Note, UnconscionabilityRedefined- California Imposes New Duties on Commercial Parties Using Form Contracts, 35 HASTINGS L.J.
161, 164 (1983).
129. Leff, supra note 127, at 487. See also Davenport, Unconscionabilityand the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 121, 138 (1967) (equating procedural unconscionability with the "unfair surprise" language of comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2-302).
130. Leff, supra note 127, at 487.
131. Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1976). See also, Leff,
supra note 127, at 539.
132. See, e.g., Avery v. Aladdin Products, Inc., 128 Ga,App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 357 (1973)
(The court construed the contract strictly with respect to U.C.C. § 2-316, found that the
exclusion of all warranties was not unconscionable, and prohibited the admission of parol
evidence to prove the existence of any warranty.).
133. An adhesion contract is a standardized contract prepared entirely by one party to
the transaction for the acceptance of the other; such a contract, due to the disparity in
bargaining power between the drafting party and the second party, must be accepted or
rejected by the second on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, without opportunity for bargaining
and under such conditions that the "adherer" cannot obtain the desired product or service
save by acquiescing in the form agreement. Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d
862, 882, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 185, 377 P.2d 284, 297 (1962).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 7-12 (terms of the typical tear-me-open
agreement).
135. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 46, § 2-203:03 (Unfair surprise involves (1) assent obtained by reason of ignorance or carelessness of one party known to the other; (2) assent
obtained by signature to forms difficult to read or deceptively arranged.).
136. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
("Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.")
137. W. HAwKLAND, supra note 46, § 2-302:03.
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may be unsophisticated. Vendors are sophisticated and therefore may
be in an unfair bargaining position with the consumer.1s s This is particularly true in the case of tear-me-open agreements where the software
producer offers no explanation or warranties to the unsophisticated
consumer as to the strengths and weaknesses of the product. The consumer, relying on statements made by salespeople, may end up with
useless software. If tear-me-open disclaimers of warranty are upheld,
all software manufacturers might offer their products with such agreements. This would remove all opportunity for bargaining for better
terms by consumers.
Substantive unconscionability in the case of warranty disclaimers is
more difficult to find. The UCC expressly permits parties to disclaim
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.13 9 Therefore, additional circumstances must exist in order for the
warranty disclaimer to be deemed unconscionable. 140 Courts have held
that a disclaimer of warranty is reasonable in the case of novel and innovative goods.141 As a result of the inherently novel and innovative
nature of software, it may be appropriate to exclude warranties on it.
This, however, is subject to the principle that it is unconscionable to
142
limit warranties in such a way as to limit remedies in all respects.
The express warranty, which cannot be disclaimed, 143 may provide sufficient remedy to avoid such a result.
V.

REMEDY LIMITATIONS

UCC Article 2, section 2-719 allows parties to a contract to limit the
remedies available in the event of a breach'" by a fair and reasonable
agreement. 45 Section 2-719 imposes no requirement of conspicuous14 7
ness. 146 Nevertheless, some courts have imposed such a requirement.
138. The relative "computer literacy" of the parties was important in leading to a finding of unconscionability in Glovatorium v. National Cash Register Corp., No. C-79-3393
(N.D. May 1, 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 684 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1982).
139. U.C.C. § 2-316.
140. R. ANDERSON, supra note 63, at § 2-316:37.
141. U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449, 460 (E.D. Mich.
1972), aff'd, 509 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975).
142. Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250, 253

(1972).
143. U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.
144. Id. § 2-719.
145. Id comment 1.
146. On its face, U.C.C. § 2-719 contains no conspicuous requirement.
147. See, e.g., Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 56 Or. App. 387, 641 P.2d 668 (Or. Ct.
App. 1982) (The court lumped U.C.C. § 2-316, which does have a conspicuousness requirement, and U.C.C. § 2-719 together and made a requirement of conspicuousness for the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of remedies.).
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Under UCC Article 2, section 2-719, the parties must be left with a
minimum adequate remedy. 148 There are three ways in which a remedy
limiting clause may be voided by the operation of section 2-719. A limitation of remedies clause may be void if it "fails of its essential purpose,"1149 is unconscionable, 150 or is not part of the bargain between the
buyer and the seller.1 5l
Neither the UCC nor the common law offer much explanation of
the meaning of "failure of essential purpose.' 1 52 While limitation of
remedies to replacement or return of the goods for refund is authorized
by the UCC,15 3 such a remedy may fail in its essential purpose if its pur-

pose is to cure nonconformity of the goods supplied. 154
There is a distinct difference between a disclaimer of warranty and
a limitation of remedies. The former reduces the obligations of a party
in performing the contract, while the latter reduces the liability in the
event of a breach. 155 A limitation of remedies must, therefore, be read
with reference to the terms of the contract which give rise to the parties' obligations. Whether a limitation of remedies clause fails of its essential purpose will depend upon what was really bargained for in the
contract.
The tear-me-open agreement is probably intended to supply computer software which will perform a particular function, determined by
either its name or description on the package. For example, the words
"Operating System" describe a system which will coordinate memory
management, task scheduling, user interface, and peripheral control. 156
In such a case, if the software does not perform those functions, then a
remedy which merely requires the supplier to replace the disk embodying the software has clearly failed of its essential purpose. Although
the software producer may have successfully disclaimed all implied
148. U.C.C. § 2-719

comment 1.

149. Id. § 2-719(2).
150. Id. § 2-719(3).
151. See, e.g., Van Den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft, 576 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978); Monsanto Agric. Prods. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); DougaUl v.
Brown Bay Boat Works, 287 Minn. 290, 178 N.W.2d 217 (1970).
152. Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of
UC.C. Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REV. 28, 39 (1977).
153. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a).
154. Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1980) (In a contract for the purchase of computer hardware and software, an exclusive remedy of repair or replacement fails of its essential purpose when its purpose was to
give the seller a chance to make the goods conform and the nonconformity could not be
cured by replacement or repair.).
155. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 46, § 2-719:02.
156. Toong & Gupta, supra note 2, at 378.
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warranties, the express warranty, which cannot be disclaimed,157 would
be applicable in the event the software does not perform any of the
claimed functions. Programs which do not perform their minimal requirements breach their express warranties, and a remedy should provide a fair quantum of damages. 158 Furthermore, if, in a case involving
a tear-me-open agreement, the court finds that the manufacturer gave a
more extensive express warranty, as suggested above, 15 9 a remedy
merely requiring replacement, repair, or refund will fail of its essential
purpose.
Many limited warranties have a limited time span. 16 0 In many
cases, it could be virtually impossible to discover a defect in the
software in such a limited time span, except where the software was
wholly and patently useless. The remedy would fail of its essential purpose because it would not provide any means of redress for a defect
which could not have been discovered within the time period
161
specified.
The minimal express warranties which might be found in shrinkwrapped software packages will not benefit the consumer when the
quality of the software is at issue. 162 It seems reasonable and just, however, that courts should find some remedy when the software flagrantly
fails to perform.
Most tear-me-open agreements attempt to disclaim all liability for
lost profits and other incidental or consequential damages which may
result from the use of the software. 163 Consequential damages are defined as losses "of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason
to know and which could not reasonably be prevented... ."164 Software
in and of itself has limited intrinsic value. Its utility lies in its ability to
perform tasks. Thus, the losses which computer users suffer as a result
of a large scale computer failure are almost always consequential. 165
The UCC regards the limitation of consequential damages for per157. U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.
158. Id. § 2-719 comment 1.
159. See supra text accompanying note 122.
160. The time span for IBM's limited warranty is 90 days. See supra note 122.
161. See supra text accompanying note 154.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 115 and 116.
163. IBM attempts to limit liability for consequential damages as follows: "IN NO
EVENT WILL IBM BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR ANY DAMAGES INCLUDING ANY
LOST PROFITS, LOST SAVINGS OR OTHER INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE SUCH PROGRAM
164. U.C.C. § 2-715(2). See also J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, supra note 109, § 10-4 (The
seller is liable when he or she had reason to know of the buyer's requirements regardless
of whether he or she consciously assumed the risks in question.).
165. Note, U.CC. §2-719 As Applied to Computer Contracts-UnconscionableExclu-

1986]

TEAR-ME-OPEN SOFTWARE

sonal injuries caused by "consumer goods" as prima facie unconscionable. 1'6 In situations where the buyer is a commercial entity or the
consequential loss is economic, and the parties are of equal bargaining
power, however, the courts will most often not find unconscionabil167
ity.
A claim of unconscionability will only be allowed in an excep16 s
tional commercial setting.
In Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp.,i 6 9 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that excluding consequential
damages by means of a computer hardware and software agreement was
not unconscionable. 170 In the Chatlos case, both parties were businesses,
and the plaintiff was a manufacturer of complex electronic equipment.
Even though many software customers are businesses, courts should
have no difficulty in finding that it is unconscionable to exclude consequential damages. The primary reasons that courts have not found
these exclusions to be unconscionable are that the parties enjoyed similar levels of sophistication and bargained for the agreements. 171 The
court therefore found that procedural unconscionability was absent.
Tear-me-open agreements do not involve a bargaining process and there
is a varying degree of sophistication between software customers and
vendors. Often, purchasers of computer software are not even
businesses.
A substantively unconscionable contractual clause is commercially
unreasonable 172 and bears no reasonable relation to the risks involved. 173 The software user assumes a high risk when acquiring
software by a tear-me-open agreement if its terms are strictly construed. The software supplier assumes no risk at all.
The Chatlos decision does not entirely defeat the claim that a remedy limitation in the case of a tear-me-open agreement is unconscionable. Courts, in the past, have upheld awards of consequential damages
sion of Remedies? Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 14 CONN. L. REV. 70,
98 (1981).
166. U.C.C. § 2-719 states: "Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable..." (emphasis added).
167. Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co., v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262 (D.C. Me. 1977).
168. Id
169. Chatlos Sys. Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979),
aff'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980). For a more in-depth discussion of this case, see Note,
supra note 165.
170. Chatlos Sys. Inc., 635 F.2d at 1086.
171. See, e.g., Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980); U.S.
Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975); Phillips Mach. Co. v.
LeBlond, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Okla. 1980).
172. Phillips Mach. Co., 494 F. Supp. at 324.
173. Id
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even in cases involving clauses waiving such damages. 1 7 4 Where the latent defect causes the damage and the purchaser has no remedy, the
disclaimer will be invalidated. 175 Defects in software are usually latent.
This is indicated by the fact that software developers have great difficulties in isolating problems with the software. 176 The software user
obviously has no way of seeing defects in advance by merely inspecting
the shrink-wrapped package.
In Majors v. Kalo Laboratories,Inc.,177 consequential damages were
178
awarded, despite the exclusion of such damages in the sale contract.
The subject matter of the transaction was an unproven fertilizer, which
had defects which were unknown to its manufacturers. The court
found the clause limiting consequential damages unconscionable because of the disparity between the cost of the product and the extent of
the damages. 1 79 In the case of software, the losses resulting from defects are also likely to be much greater than the cost of the software to
the user. 8 0 This is not a particularly persuasive argument,' 8 ' but the
facts that the defects are latent and the seller or developer of the
software is probably in a far better position to discover and insure
against defects than is the purchaser, make the argument more
compelling.
The UCC requires an evaluation of the "commercial setting, purpose and effect" of the clause before a finding of unconscionability can
be made. 8 2 While the exclusion of consequential damages may be procedurally unconscionable, such an exclusion may be commercially reasonable. A heavy burden would be placed on software developers if
they had to develop defect-free software or acquire insurance against all
possible results of errors in their software. It may be economically undesirable to make the software industry bear this burden. 183 Software
could become prohibitively expensive and small software producers
might become reluctant to develop new programs.
174. See, e.g., Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
175. Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649, 655 (W.D. Pa. 1968),
aff'd in part .vacated in part on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 826 (1970).
176. Immel, supra note 94.
177. 407 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
178. Id. at 23.
179. Id.
180. Packages typically retail for under $50. Toong & Gupta, supra note 2 at 378.
181. The price of the software might be low because the producer need not procure
insurance against the damages arising if it is defective. This cost is to be borne by the
consumer. Note, Frankly Incredible: Unconscionability in Computer Contracts, 4 CoMPUTER L.J. 695, 735 (1983).
182. U.C.C. § 2-302(2).
183. But see Note, supra note 181.
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A limitation of remedy will not be enforced if it is not part of the
bargain between the buyer and the seller.'i 4 Courts have refused to uphold a limitation of remedy on this basis when the plaintiff could not be
85
charged with knowledge of the limitation at the time of the sale.1
This situation usually arises in cases involving owners manuals that
contain warranty and remedy limitations.18 6 In these cases, the consumers could not discover the limitations until they purchased the
goods. The tear-me-open remedy limitation will be unenforceable if the
software transaction is deemed to have taken place in the computer
store and the consumer is not charged with knowledge of the remedy
limitation due to the lack of conspicuousness of the remedy
8 7

limitation.1

VI.

CLOSELY ANALOGOUS CASES

As previously mentioned, certain cases are analogous to tear-meopen agreements. The most similar cases are those involving warranty
and remedy limitations printed on the labels or containers of goods such
as herbicides or seeds.' 8 8 While the analysis offered by these cases is
helpful, it must be noted that in deciding whether or not to enforce
such disclaimers, the courts have not had to deal with an issue unique
to computer software. This issue is the fact that computer software contains intellectual property which is easily copied without detection.
This factor may supply a strong incentive for enforcing tear-me-open
89
software agreements.
A case with facts strongly analogous to those which may be
presented by litigation arising out of a tear-me-open agreement is Monsanto Agric. Prod. Co. v. Edenfield.19° Monsanto marketed its herbicide
"Lasso" through distributors who in turn sold it to dealers and farmers.' 9 ' Lasso was sold in five gallon cans with labels and instruction
booklets affixed to their tops. The labels contained language limiting
184. See Dougall v. Brown Bay Boat Works, 287 Minn. 290, 178 N.W.2d 217 (Minn.
1970); Pfizer Genetics v. Williams Management, 204 Neb. 151, 281 N.W.2d 536 (Neb. 1979).
185. See, e.g., Pennington Grain & Seed Co. v. Tuten, 422 So. 2d 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
186. Dougall, 287 Minn. at 290, 178 N.W.2d at 217.
187. The same reasoning is applicable to the determination of whether the limitation

of remedies is accepted as to the determination of whether the contract as a whole is accepted. See supra text accompanying notes 63-92.
188. Monsanto Agric. Prod. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
190. Monsanto, 426 So. 2d at 574.
191. Computer software is marketed in much the same way. Manufacturers sell to
computer stores who in turn sell to customers. Courts generally no longer regard the
lack of privity between manufacturer and customers as an obstacle to the customer recovering from the manufacturer.
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warranties to those of chemical composition and fitness for the purposes
described in the directions for use of the herbicide. Liability for breach
of these warranties was limited to refund of the purchase price. 192 The
following notice appeared on the face of the instruction booklets: "Read
'LIMIT OF WARRANTY AND LIABILITY' before buying or using. If
19 3
terms are not acceptable, return at once unopened."
The plaintiff, a soybean grower, bought the herbicide and used it to
protect his crop from weeds. Unfortunately, the herbicide failed to control the weeds. Instead, the weeds choked the soybean plants. 194 The
court stated that in order for a warranty limitation to be effective, certain requirements had to be met. First, it had to be part of the bargain
between the parties and reasonably consistent with any express warranties made. It had to be in writing, conspicuous, and not unconsionable.195 The court held that all these requirements were met by
Monsanto's disclaimer. 196 The plaintiff conceded that he had read the
directions for use of the herbicide. This led the court to hold that "even
if appellee did not know of the limitation of warranty at the time of
purchase of the product, it became a part of the bargain between appellee and Monsanto, by virtue of appellee's assent thereto."'1 97
A similar case from the same state, citing the same authority as
Monsanto, reached a different result. In Pennington Grain & Seed, Inc.
v. Tuten,198 warranty disclaimers printed on labels attached to seed bags
were held to be ineffective because they "amounted to a post-contract,
unbargained-for unilateral attempt to limit [the seller's] obligations
under the contract."' 199 Interpreting Florida's version of UCC Article 2,
section 2-316, the court stated:
The very purpose of the statutory requirement is that any limitation be
brought to the attention of the buyer at the time the contract is made.
An attempted limitation at the time of delivery long after a contract of
purchase is signed does not accomplish this purpose, being a unilateral
attempt of a party to limit its obligations. 20 0
This language leads to a conclusion that unless the terms of the tearme-open agreement are brought to the consumer's attention in the computer store or in the mail order catalog, they are unenforceable.
Both the Monsanto and Pennington Grain courts cited Pfizer Ge192. Monsanto, 426 So. 2d at 575.
193. Id.
194. Id
195. Id at 576.
196. Id. at 577-78.
197. IM at 578.
198. 422 So. 2d 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
199. Id. at 951.
200. Id (quoting Christopher & Son, Inc. v. Kansas Print & Color Co., 215 Kan. 185,
523 P.2d 709 (1974)).
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netics, Inc. v. Williams Management Co. 2 0 1 in support of their holdings.
Pfizer Genetics involved disclaimers printed on seed bags which were
delivered after the conclusion of a written agreement between the

buyer and seller. The court stated the general rule that: "[D]isclaimers
[of] warranty made on or after delivery of the goods by means of an invoice, receipt, or similar note are ineffectual unless the buyer assents or
is charged with knowledge as to the transaction.1 202 Similar reasoning
was used to defeat a disclaimer of warranty printed on the side of a
container in Willoughby v. Ciba Geigy Corp. 203 The Pfizer Genetics
case was remanded for consideration of the question whether the plaintiff assented or is charged with knowledge of nonwarranty as to the
2 °4
transaction.
The court in Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp.,20 5 upheld a label warranty and limitation of remedies similar to that in Monsanto. Oral
statements made by a saleperson concerning the capabilities of the herbicide were dismissed as mere "puffing. ' ' 2°6 The disclaimer was upheld
primarily because the plaintiff admitted having read it.
In many cases where label warranties have been upheld, the plaintiff had in fact read the challenged terms. IBM tries to ensure that the
software user will read the agreement at some point by duplicating it in
the instruction manual of the software. Thus, in the event litigation
arises because a customer is dissatisfied with the performance of the
software, IBM will argue that most software users read the instructions
for new software at some stage. This might enable a court to charge the
plaintiff with knowledge of the disclaimer. The plaintiff's response to
this argument would be that he or she did indeed read the disclaimer,
but only after unwrapping the software. Because of this, the plaintiff
should argue that the software could not have returned for a refund.
The consumer not only has a counterargument to IBM's, based on the
uniqueness of tear-me-open agreements, but may also rely on cases refusing to uphold warranty and remedy limitations found in owners
20 7
manuals and instruction books.
VII.

CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSE

The UCC and the case law generally allow parties to choose the
state law which is to govern their transaction.2 0 8 Some states, however,
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

204 Neb. 151, 281 N.W.2d 536 (Neb. 1979).
Id. at 155, 281 N.W.2d at 539.
601 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
Pfizer Genetics, 204 Neb. at 156, 281 N.W.2d at 539.
696 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 291.
See supra text accompanying note 18.
See Goldberg, supra note 24, at 453. See also U.C.C. § 1-102(30) (parties can mod-
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have adopted a public policy exception to this party autonomy rule.2 °9
This view has been criticized because it defeats the UCC's objectives of
uniformity and certainty.2 10 The effect of the choice of law clause is of
obvious importance where software is marketed in states which have
enacted consumer protection statutes. This Note will not attempt an indepth analysis of the relationship between state consumer laws and the
UCC
VIII.

CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that off-the-shelf computer software is here to
stay. Because of the nature of software and the impossibility of producing defect-free programs, 211 software manufacturers will probably continue to attempt to limit their liability for defective programs. At some
stage, courts will undoubtedly be faced with the question of whether to
uphold tear-me-open software agreements.
In some respects tear-me-open agreements should be treated no differently than any other standard form agreement. In deciding whether
to uphold or void such agreements, courts should balance many competing factors. These factors include the relative bargaining positions of
213
the parties, 2 12 whether one party is a consumer or commercial entity,
and the harshness of the terms of the agreement.2 1 4 The fact that computer software can easily be copied is a unique factor which cannot be
ignored.
An important consideration underlying the decision of whether to
enforce tear-me-open software contracts and their individual terms is
the policy of encouraging new technological developments. The costs of
developing and testing software are high. Insistence that software be
perfect before it is put into the marketplace, or that the software makers be insurers, will most likely deter production of innovative software.
The cost of software would thus become prohibitively high and would
ify all Code provisions with the exception of the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care). See also Jaskey Finance & Leasing Co. v. Display Data Corp., 564
F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (the court upheld a choice of law clause). But see Suntogs of
Miami, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 433 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (A choice of law
clause specified Michigan law as governing a contract, but made the Florida statute of limitations govern; the statute of limitations clause would be void under Florida, but not
Michigan law. Although Florida did not enact the public policy exception to U.C.C. § 1102(3), the court refused to enforce the statute of limitations clause.).
209. See Goldberg, supra note 24, at 453.
210. Id
211. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
212. See supra text accompanying note 138.
213. See supra text accompanying note 67.
214. Note, supra note 181, at 734-35.
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have a detrimental effect on the development of businesses and technology in general.
Courts faced with this issue should consider the nature of the process by which the agreement is brought to the attention of the customer. Currently; the standard tear-me-open agreement may not be
sufficiently conspicuous to bind a software customer. The rights relinquished by the customer seem too important to be lost by the mere performance of an act which is not normally associated with the acceptance
of a contractual offer. Unless courts expand their interpretation of the
express warranties, customers will be bound by unconscionable contractual terms.
Nevertheless, tear-me-open agreements and their terms limiting liability are not fundamentally flawed in principle. The social and economic policies at stake may well require their enforcement. 21 5 If the
software producers intend their tear-me-open agreements to do more
than deter their dissatisfied customers from filing lawsuits, however,
they should place a more conspicuous agreement notice on the software
package. Software producers would be well advised to use a more distinctive means of implementing the theory behind tear-me-open agreements. A conspicuous seal which can only be broken by means of a
knife or similar tool is a possible alternative to a cellophane wrapper.
The seal would carry a notice warning the customer that breaking it
will bind the customer to certain contractual terms which the customer
should read in advance. In addition, the customer should be provided
with more information as to the capabilities of the software. Currently,
the customer is acquiring an unknown quantity and assuming all risks
associated with it.
As is true in the label warranty cases, it will be difficult to formulate a single rule for all situations involving tear-me-open agreements.
As computers and software become more sophisticated and powerful,
their applications will become more diverse. 21 6 Computers are already
used in the home, office, and factory for tasks varying from the management of household alarm systems to business accounting systems and
industrial process control and will be used even more in the future.
Much of the software which will be used will be ready made and acquired through mass marketing channels. Therefore, more people will
become sophisticated in the use of computers and computer software.
As such, certain agreements will be unconscionable for some and not
for others. If the principle behind tear-me-open agreements finds acceptance in the courts, cases arising from such agreements should be
215. See supra text accompanying notes 182-183.
216. See Note, supra note 1.
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evaluated with careful consideration of the facts of each situation in the
context of societal needs.
Michael Schwarz

